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S UMMARY
Most analysts agree that critical ingredients for economic growth, competitiveness, and welfare
in the United States have been policies that encourage strong investment in research and
development (R&D) and innovation. In addition, there is a general perception that technological
innovation must be based in the United States to remain a pillar of the American economy. 
Over the past decade, however, the rise of Asia as an important location for “innovation
offshoring” has begun to challenge these familiar notions and the sense of complacency they
have engendered. Based on original research, the paper demonstrates that innovation off-
shoring is driven by profound changes in corporate innovation management as well as by
the globalization of markets for technology and knowledge workers. U.S. companies are at
the forefront of this trend, experimenting with new approaches to the management of global
innovation networks. But Asian governments and firms are playing an increasingly active
role as promoters and new sources of innovation. 
Innovation offshoring has created a competitive challenge of historic proportions for
the United States. There are concerns that innovation offshoring may extend the “hollowing-
out” of the U.S. economy well beyond manufacturing to include research and development,
the most precious source of its economic growth. Some fear that a loss of knowledge worker
jobs to Asia may erode the nation’s innovative capabilities. These concerns may feed into
increasing technological protectionism.
But the simple metaphor—Asia’s rise versus America’s decline—is clearly misleading.
This paper demonstrates that innovation offshoring does not have to be a zero-sum game.
It also creates new opportunities for the United States and for U.S.-Asia economic relations.
Stronger innovation capabilities in Asia create new markets for U.S. firms. More importantly,
the globalization of markets for technology and knowledge workers and the expansion of
knowledge diffusion through global innovation networks create a powerful catalyst for
renewed efforts at home to strengthen the U.S. innovation system. In short, more innovation
in Asia does not mean less innovation in the United States—Asia’s progress may well
enhance our capacity to produce significant innovations and market-defining standards.
The United States needs a new national strategy to cope with the opportunities and
challenges posed by innovation offshoring. This report recommends that such a strategy
include the following elements:
1.  Improve access to and collection of innovation-related data to inform the national
policy debate;
2.  Address “home-made” causes of innovation offshoring by sustaining and building
upon existing strengths of the U.S. innovation system;
3.  Support corporate innovation by (1) providing tax incentives to spur early-stage
investments in innovative start-ups and (2) reforming the U.S. patent system so it is
more accessible to smaller inventors and innovators; and
4.  Upgrade the U.S. talent pool of knowledge workers by (1) providing incentives to study
science and engineering; (2) encouraging the development of management, interpretive,
cross-cultural, and other “soft” capabilities; and (3) encouraging immigration of highly
skilled workers.
Dieter Ernst is a


















Most analysts agree that critical ingredients for economic growth, competitiveness, and
welfare in the United States have been policies that encourage strong investment in research
and development (R&D) and innovation. In addition, there is a general perception that
technological innovation must be based in the United States to remain a pillar of the
American economy. 
Over the past decade, however, the rise of Asia* as an important location for “innovation
offshoring” has begun to challenge these familiar notions and the sense of complacency they
have engendered. U.S. companies are at the forefront of this trend, experimenting with new
approaches to the management of global innovation networks. But Asian governments and
firms are playing an increasingly active role as promoters and new sources of innovation. 
Innovation offshoring is therefore likely to accelerate. It is driven by fundamental changes
in corporate innovation management as well as the globalization of markets for technology
and knowledge workers.† Innovation offshoring thus creates a whole new set of challenges—
and opportunities—for the United States in its relations with the Asia Pacific region. 
The main drivers of this change are global corporations, primarily from the United States.
They are increasing their overseas investment in R&D while seeking to integrate geographically
dispersed innovation clusters into global networks of production, engineering, development,
and research. This trend has added a new dimension to the traditional notion of global
production networks (GPNs), transforming them into global innovation networks (GINs). 
Much of the action now is in Asia, owing to competition for Asia’s lower-cost knowledge
workers, the region’s large and increasingly sophisticated markets, and policies aimed at
developing the region’s innovative capabilities. U.S. companies “offshore” stages of innovation
to Asian affiliates to tap into the lower-cost talent pool and innovative capabilities of the
region’s leading export economies. This has led to the establishment of intra-firm GINs.
But U.S. firms also “outsource” some stages of innovation to specialized Asian suppliers as
part of complex inter-firm GINs.
It is time to correct earlier claims that only low-level service jobs will move offshore
1
and that there is “little evidence” of a major push by American companies to set up research
operations in the developing world.
2 Innovation offshoring goes far beyond the migration of
relatively routine services like call centers, software programming, and business process support
—the subject of current public debates on “outsourcing.” Beyond adaptation, innovation
offshoring in Asia now also encompasses the creation of new products and processes. 
This opens new opportunities for Asia to move beyond its traditional role as the primary
“global factory” for manufactures, software, and business services. But it also raises tough
policy and strategic challenges. Across the region, governments and domestic firms are all







* Throughout this paper, “Asia” excludes Japan. Unless indicated otherwise, data are from the author’s
research.
† “Knowledge workers,” a term originally coined by the late Peter Drucker, is defined to include science 
and engineering personnel. This term also refers to managers and specialized professionals in areas such 
as marketing, legal services, and industrial design who provide essential support services to research,
development, and engineering.4
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China and India have clearly been at the forefront, but equally important are developments
in South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia.
In the United States, there are concerns that innovation offshoring may extend the
“hollowing-out” of the economy well beyond manufacturing to include R&D, the most
precious source of its economic growth. It is feared that a loss of knowledge worker jobs to
Asia may erode the nation’s innovative capabilities. These fears may well feed into increasing
technological protectionism.
But innovation offshoring does not need to be a zero-sum game. It also creates new
opportunities for the United States and for U.S.-Asia economic relations. Stronger innovation
capabilities in Asia create new markets for U.S. firms. More importantly, as markets for
technology and knowledge workers become globalized and as knowledge diffusion expands
through GINs, this creates a powerful catalyst for renewed efforts at home to strengthen the
U.S. innovation system. In short, more innovation in Asia does not mean less innovation in
the United States—Asia’s progress may well enhance our capacity to produce significant
innovations and market-defining standards.
In short, both the United States and Asia need alternative strategies and policies to cope
with these new opportunities and challenges. Unfortunately, we still know relatively little
about the forces that are driving or constraining the offshoring and outsourcing of innovation
to Asia. We know even less about possible impacts and effective policy responses.
This paper explores how innovation offshoring is likely to affect U.S.-Asia economic
relations and discusses policy responses. The analysis focuses on the electronics industry,
which dominates U.S.-Asia trade and direct investment, using chip design as a test case to
examine the forces driving the offshoring of innovation. 
n Part I reviews the foundations of Asia’s rise as an important location for innovation
offshoring, highlighting achievements and policies to cope with the decreasing returns
to the export-led global factory model. 
n Part II analyzes the forces behind the growing organizational and geographical mobility
of innovation within GINs and explores what they imply for innovation offshoring. 
n Part III summarizes findings of the case study, examining the growing complexity of
design stages and capabilities performed in Asia and the forces that are driving the
offshoring of chip design. 
n Part IV offers generic policy suggestions for the United States to ensure that benefits of
innovation offshoring are not countered by a creeping longer-term hollowing-out of the
nation’s talent pool and its production and innovation system.
T HE R ISE OF A SIA
The emergence of Asia as an important location for innovation offshoring signals a profound
shift in the center of gravity in the global economy. It owes much to the region’s success
as the primary global factory in industries as diverse as textiles, footwear, agro-industries,
electronics, steel, cars, machine tools, software, and IT-enabled business services. 5
THE GLOBAL FACTORY
The integration of Asian firms into GPNs provides a fascinating example of how linkages with
foreign firms have stimulated industrial development.
3 Through GPNs, Asian firms have been
able to tap into the world’s leading markets, especially in the United States, and compensate
for the initially small size of their domestic markets. Network participation also has provided
access to leading-edge technology and best-practice management approaches. This, in turn,
has created new opportunities, pressures, and incentives for Asian network suppliers to
upgrade their technological and management capabilities and the skill levels of workers.
4
Aggressive support policies of Asian governments enabled local firms to take advantage
of opportunities to improve their positions in these networks. The result is one of the most
impressive success stories of Third World economic development. During the first years of
the new century, the region’s rate of growth in gross domestic product (GDP), trade, and
inward foreign direct investment (FDI) has surpassed even the impressive pace it achieved
during the 1980s and 1990s. Asia also has become an increasingly sophisticated market for
an even wider array of goods and services. 
China is at the center of Asia’s accelerated rise in the global economy. Estimates for
2006 suggest that China will overtake the United Kingdom to become the fourth-largest
economy at market prices.
5 When differing price levels between countries are taken into
account, China already ranks second in terms of its GDP at purchasing power parity prices.
Based on its swelling trade surplus, China is projected to accumulate more than $1,000
billion in foreign exchange, a total that would surpass Japan’s projected reserves. China’s
rising economic power is reflected in its refusal to succumb to U.S. pressure for a quick
revaluation of the renminbi against the dollar. There is also speculation that China is likely
to reduce its purchases of U.S. dollar-denominated assets.
Some skeptics doubt China’s rise in the global economy.
6 They point out that China’s
share of global GDP in 2005 stood at 4.9 percent, while China’s exports accounted for
7.3 percent of global exports. “China is still a tiny cog in the global wheel,” they conclude.
The fallacy of using such aggregate data becomes evident when one looks at specific sectors.
No other industry reflects Asia’s rise as well as the electronics industry. Asia’s five leading
exporting countries (China, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia) today account for
more than one-fourth of world electronics manufacturing output. These five countries occupy
leading positions in global markets for digital consumer electronics, computers, and mobile
devices, as well as for high-precision components, such as semiconductors and displays.
In the semiconductor industry, for instance, roughly 70 percent of output is now based in
Asia. In addition, India has firmly established itself as a global export production base for software
and IT-enabled business services and is emerging as the next frontier for offshore manufacturing
in sectors as diverse as car components, electronic components, and pharmaceuticals.
This process has culminated in China’s emergence as the dominant global factory
location. Since 2004, China has surpassed the United States as the world’s largest exporter
of electronic products—a dramatic increase from its 10th place position in 2000. The rapid
improvement in the country’s export portfolio has been particularly noteworthy. Digital
consumer electronics and mobile telecommunications equipment have increased relative
to commodity-type appliances. In addition, PCs and electronic components have become







At the same time, China’s emergence as the second-largest electronics importer (up
from seventh place in 2000), indicates the growing importance of Asia’s rapidly growing and
increasingly sophisticated markets for communications, computing, and digital consumer
equipment, and for the electronic components (especially semiconductors) required by Asia’s
global electronics factories. The main prize is the sheer size of China’s market for electronics
hardware and services.* China is the world’s largest market for telecommunications equipment
(wired and wireless) as well as a test bed for advanced third-generation wireless communication
systems. China is also one of the most demanding markets for computing and digital
consumer equipment. Since China produces most of that equipment, it has become the
world’s third-largest market for semiconductors, which, as we will see below, has generated
substantial demand for chip design.
UPGRADING THROUGH TECHNOLOGY DIVERSIFICATION
Asia’s role as the global factory will continue to be an important source for economic growth
and the development of industrial capabilities. However, the 1997 financial crisis and the
downturn in the global electronics industry in 2000 have brutally exposed the downside of
that model. A country is vulnerable if (1) a large share of its exports are electronics, (2) it
is highly integrated into GPNs, and (3) it depends to a large degree on exports to the
United States for revenue. 
In addition, there are decreasing returns to the global factory model.
7 As the capital
intensity of such investment increases, it generates less new employment. Local spillovers to
domestic suppliers also decline as global contract manufacturers provide integrated manufac-
turing services, which increases their share of global factory production. Furthermore, much
of the global factory investment has remained “footloose,” which has led to plant closures
and relocation to new lower-cost locales. 
Asian firms heavily rely on American, Japanese, and European firms as the dominant
sources of new technology. This reflects the heavy concentration of R&D, innovative
capabilities, and intellectual property rights (IPR), much of it centered on the United
States.
8 For Asian firms, this has resulted in razor-thin profit margins owing to the hefty
licensing fees charged by the global brand firms.
Across the region, a broad consensus has emerged that the Asian electronics industry
must upgrade to higher value-added and technologically more demanding products, services,
and production stages. Such changes require the development of strong innovative capabilities.
To achieve this goal, Asian governments and leading electronics and software companies
have sought to develop and improve the skills, knowledge, and management techniques
needed to create and successfully commercialize new products, services, equipment,
processes, and business models.
They have focused pragmatically on what is feasible in view of the fact that the region
continues to lag substantially behind advanced nations in the development of a broad-based
science and technology system.
9 Instead of jumping right into “technology leadership” strategies





in the global factory
model 
* In the electronics industry, China has become the main export market for the United States, Japan, Taiwan,
and South Korea. 7
focused on technology diversification. This arguably laid an important foundation for the
region’s success in attracting innovation offshoring. 
Technology diversification, defined as the expansion of a company’s or a product’s
technology base into a broader range of technology areas, focuses on applied research and
the development of products that draw on component and process technologies that are not
necessarily new to the world or difficult to acquire.
10 Such diversification has enabled Asian
firms to build on their existing strengths in manufacturing, process development, and
prototype development. They also have been able to leverage their experience in providing
knowledge-intensive support services required to raise money and to manage supply chains
and customer relations, knowledge exchange, and the development of human resources.
Most importantly, technology diversification has enabled Asian firms to use their accumulated
capabilities to implement, assimilate, and improve foreign technologies since technology
diversification often requires the exchange of knowledge with foreign parties.
ACHIEVEMENTS
The results of these efforts are impressive. Asian governments and leading electronics and
software companies have mobilized substantial investments to improve infrastructure (especially
for broadband communication), and to support leading-edge R&D programs in a few high-
priority areas. South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan together with small Nordic
countries in Europe lead the world in broadband access and speed. A few regions in China
and India that have attracted innovation offshoring are also catching up rapidly.
11
In addition, gross domestic expenditures on R&D have substantially increased in Asia’s
five leading electronics exporting countries, with China and Singapore experiencing the
fastest rise. This has led to a substantial growth in the output of scientific papers, in citation
ratios of these papers, and in the number of patents invented in Asia granted by the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office.
12 As a result, new innovation clusters have emerged for







United States Japan India Taiwan China Singapore South Korea
Number of patents in 2003:
87,600 35,500 350 5,300 370 440 4,000
1986 = 1
Ordered by 2003 value
Index calculated on 3
year moving averages
Growth in U.S. Patents* Invented in Asia, 1986–2003
Source: Hicks, D. “Growth in Asian S&T Capability and R&D Offshoring.” Slide presentation at the Council of Foreign Relations, New York,
May 24, 2005.8
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broadband technology and applications in South Korea and Singapore; for mobile
communications and digital consumer devices in South Korea, Taiwan, and China; and
for software engineering and embedded software development in India.
Some Asian governments and leading companies have made concerted efforts to support
research programs and the development of alternative standards. In telecommunications, for
example, South Korea’s four leading players (Samsung, SK Telecom, KT, and LG) are engaged
in serious efforts to become major platform and content developers for complex technology
systems, especially in mobile communications. These efforts build on considerable capabilities
to develop complex technology systems that have been accumulated in public research labs,
like the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI), and in the Chaebol
R&D labs. Examples include TDX (a switching system), and communication systems based
on Qualcomm’s CDMA (code-division multiple access) standard. 
Another important example is China’s attempt to develop an alternative third-generation
(3G) digital wireless standard, called TD-SCDMA (time-division synchronous code-division
multiple access). Datang Telecom, a Chinese state-owned enterprise, and the Research
Institute of the Ministry of Information Industry developed the TD-SCDMA standard with
technical assistance from Siemens. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU), in
turn, approved it in August 2000.*
To accelerate the implementation of this strategy, Datang formed a series of collaborative
agreements with global industry leaders to conduct China-based R&D. There is a joint
venture with Nokia, Texas Instruments, the South Korean LG group, and Taiwanese ODM
(original design manufacturing) suppliers, a joint venture with Philips and Samsung, and a
licensing agreement with STMicroelectronics. These agreements provide the Chinese company
access to critical design building blocks. Such linkages illustrate the important role that these
programs play in attracting innovation offshoring.
SKILLS AND CAPABILITIES
Asia’s greatest attraction for innovation offshoring results from impressive improvements in
the region’s talent pool. Building on existing strengths in volume manufacturing, Asian firms
have developed a broad range of specialized skills and capabilities. These include quality
control and the management of resources, supply chains, and customer relations. 
But to remain in the GPNs, Asian firms had to move into product development and,
increasingly, into system design and integrated circuit design.
13 Proximity to Asia’s vast
electronics manufacturing base has been an important asset since product development
focuses on manufacturability and the production of commercial samples. As documented
in the case study below, Asian firms made substantial progress developing specialized skills
required for complex design projects. 
Most importantly, according to the National Science Board, Asia’s leading electronics
exporting countries have substantially expanded “their higher education systems and the high-








* The two dominant competing global 3G standards are W-CDMA, which is compatible with existing GSM
operations and supported by European firms, and CDMA 2000, which is compatible with existing CDMA
operations and supported by U.S. firms.9
centers of excellence. In the past, these … countries have been the main source of internationally
mobile scientific and technical talent, but recently some of them have developed programs
designed to retain their highly trained personnel and to even attract people from abroad.”
14
For instance, China now graduates almost four times as many engineers as the United
States. South Korea—with one-sixth of the population and one-twentieth of the GDP—
graduates nearly the same number of engineers as the United States.
15 China is experiencing
explosive growth in Ph.D.-level degrees in science and engineering (S&E), the critical
indicator of a country’s research capabilities. A recent report prepared for the National Bureau
of Economic Research shows that between 1995 and 2003, first-year entrants in science and
engineering Ph.D. programs in China increased six-fold, from 8,139 to 48,740. The report
concludes that “(a)t this rate China will produce more S&E doctorates than the United
States by 2010!”
16
Such rapid expansion will undoubtedly come at the cost of a declining quality of graduate
education, at least outside of a handful of elite universities. A recent McKinsey report shows
that, if all negatives are factored in, only 25 percent of India’s engineering graduates are suitable
for work at global corporations, while the current share in China is only 10 percent.
17
However, the report also shows that the current supply of suitable engineers in low-wage
countries represents as much as three-quarters of the suitable engineering talent pool in higher-
wage countries. This share is substantially higher than the 44 percent share of low-wage
countries in the total supply of suitable young professionals in higher-income countries.*
Furthermore, the supply of suitable young engineers is expected to grow much faster in low-
wage countries than in higher-wage countries. McKinsey projects that by 2008 low-wage
countries will supply the same number of suitable young engineers as in higher-wage countries. 
Highly skilled knowledge workers are much cheaper in Asia (outside of Japan) than in the
United States. For instance, the cost of employing a chip design engineer in Asia is typically
between 10 to 20 percent of the cost in Silicon Valley.† Since coordinating cross-continental
design teams is likely to add substantial costs, industry experts estimate the net advantage to
be between 30 and 50 percent. Cost savings of such magnitude obviously are important for
companies that are under constant pressure to improve their return-on-investment. The
potential savings also provide an important incentive for innovation offshoring.
18
ASIA’S GROWING EXPOSURE TO INNOVATION OFFSHORING
Large global corporations are setting a fast pace for innovation offshoring in Asia. For
instance, the share of R&D in Asia of U.S. firms has almost quadrupled from 3 percent of
$12 billion in 1994 to close to 12 percent of $20 billion in 2002.
19 A recent survey of the
world’s largest R&D spenders showed that in 2004 China had become the third most
important offshore R&D location after the United States and the United Kingdom,
followed by India (sixth) and Singapore (ninth).
20 More than half of the responding firms









* McKinsey defines “young professionals” as university graduates with up to seven years of work experience.
This includes engineers, finance and accounting specialists, generalist professionals, life science researchers,
and quantitative analysts. Not included are doctors, nurses, and various support staff. 
† This cost comparison includes salary, benefits, equipment, office space, and other infrastructure.10
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Much of the R&D offshoring to Asia is concentrated in the electronics industry, with
China dominating hardware R&D and India attracting software R&D. As for non-equity
forms of R&D internationalization (offshore outsourcing), China is now the third most
important location behind the United States and the United Kingdom, but ahead of
Germany and France. India is ranked equal to Japan.
The same survey projects that the pace of R&D internationalization will accelerate—
as many as 67 percent of the respondents to the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) survey stated that the share of foreign R&D will increase; only
2 percent indicated the opposite. Large U.S. corporations are likely to play a critical role in
driving this trend. Many have revealed plans to expand their reliance on R&D internation-
alization. As the following graph illustrates, the number of U.S. company patents invented
in Asia has drastically increased over the last few years (albeit from a very low level), outpacing
the growth in any other region. Furthermore, Japanese and South Korean firms have indicated
they are keen to move beyond their current low levels of R&D internationalization. In
short, Asia is expected to receive much of the future R&D internationalization, with China
being a more attractive location for future foreign R&D than even the United States or India. 
Source: Hicks, D. “Growth in Asian S&T Capability and R&D Offshoring.” Slide presentation at the Council of Foreign Relations, New York,
May 24, 2005.
An important new development is that smaller U.S. high-tech companies, and even
start-ups, are facing considerable pressures to engage in innovation offshoring. In fact,
venture capitalists in Silicon Valley now require start-ups to present an “offshore outsourcing”
plan as a precondition for receiving the next round of funding. The emerging business
model is to keep strategic management functions like customer relations and marketing,
finance, and business development in Silicon Valley, while increasingly moving product
development and research work to offshore locations. 
This has given rise to new and unconventional business models of innovation offshoring
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R&D Globalization: Growth in U.S. Company Patents 
Invented Here and Abroad, 1985–200311
there is a start-up company in Shangdi Information Industrial Base in Beijing’s Haidian
District that specializes in mixed-signal chip design. Chinese engineers who hold Ph.D.
degrees from leading U.S. universities and have worked as senior project managers in
leading U.S. semiconductor companies founded the company. 
The company has received venture capital funding for developing chip designs in both China
and Silicon Valley. A fully integrated design team in Beijing develops decoder chips customized
for the new Chinese AVS (audio-video signal) standard. Of the more than 60 engineers at the
Beijing facility, 90 percent hold at least a master’s degree. Five senior managers based in Santa
Clara handle customer relations and provide design building blocks (“silicon intellectual
properties,” or SIPs) and tool vendors for design automation, testing, and verification.
“Offshoring brokers” are emblematic of the fine-grained division of labor in innovation
offshoring. They provide another important approach for start-ups based in Silicon Valley.
A typical example is a company, based in Santa Clara, California, and Ahmedabad, India,
which was founded by an Indian design engineer with a distinguished track record in
leading U.S. semiconductor firms. The company was established specifically to work as an
offshoring broker to the U.S. semiconductor industry. It started out testing designs, but has
expanded its services considerably and now provides everything from concept design to the
development of SIPs. The company’s main focus, however, is to help U.S. semiconductor
firms run R&D teams in India in a manner that minimizes risks of disruption and bridges
potential communications gaps. 
T HE N EW M OBILITY OF I NNOVATION
Innovation offshoring runs counter to established wisdom. It is widely assumed that for a
firm to grow, it must control resources that are valuable, rare, and to a significant extent
immobile, and that “a firm’s rate of growth is limited by the growth of knowledge within
it.”
21 A related assumption is that innovation, in contrast to most other stages of the value
chain, is highly immobile: it remains tied to specific locations, despite a rapid geographic
dispersion of markets, finance, and production.
22
Only a decade ago, research on the geographical distribution of patents demonstrated
that innovative activities of the world’s largest firms were among the least internationalized
of their functions.
23 Experts assumed that innovation within the firm was and would always
be highly localized because it usually requires dense exchange of knowledge (much of it tacit)
between the users and producers of the resultant new technologies. Attempts to explain such




There is no question that the demanding requirements of managing complex innovation
projects tend to concentrate innovation in the home country. However, research on global-
ization has clearly established that the center of gravity has shifted beyond the national
economy.
25 International linkages proliferate as markets for capital, goods, services, technology,
and knowledge workers are integrated across borders.
26 While integration is far from perfect,
Globalization
research reveals






especially in the latter two markets, it is nevertheless transforming the geography of
innovation.
27
As markets for technology and knowledge workers have globalized, fundamental
changes have occurred in corporate innovation management. A gradual opening and
networking of corporate innovation systems is giving rise to global innovation networks
(GINs) that cut across firm boundaries, sectors, and national borders. Thus, instead of a few
preeminent centers of innovation, there are now “multiple locations for innovation, and
even lower-order or less developed centers can still be sources of innovation.”
28
Moreover, there is a growing recognition that the balance is shifting from “centripetal”
to “centrifugal” forces—i.e., the globalization of markets, technology, competition, and
strategy and the resultant opening of corporate innovation systems have boosted the forces
for geographical decentralization of R&D. “Pull” factors that attract R&D to particular
locations include demand-oriented and supply-oriented forces and policies. “Centrifugal”
forces can be stronger than “centripetal” forces when the host country market is large, grows
rapidly, and becomes more sophisticated. 
Supply-oriented forces are especially important in high-tech industries like electronics.
29
Proximity to global manufacturing bases matters. However, the search for lower-cost overseas
R&D personnel and for new ideas and innovative capabilities is increasingly important. As
the pace and cost of technological development escalate and as the sources of breakthrough
general-purpose technologies proliferate, companies must seek access to a wider range of
scientific and technological skills and knowledge than is available in the home market.
How can research teams located at distant locations exchange complex knowledge? The
economics of knowledge diffusion, the market for knowledge workers, and the innovators’
strategies to protect and exploit intellectual property rights together shape the location of
innovation. Equally important, members of a specialized knowledge community—the people
who share specialized skills like analog chip design—share rules and codes of exchanging
knowledge. Even when dispersed far away in space, members of such communities “will
share more jargon and trust among each other than with any outsider within their present
local communities. And even when meetings are required, their frequency will not necessarily
be as high as to impose co-localization as a necessary requirement for belonging to the
epistemic community.”
30
In short, for innovative activities that require complex knowledge it is now possible to
create and connect teams of knowledge workers in distant locations, such as Silicon Valley,
Seoul, Taiwan’s Hsinchu Science Park, Beijing, Shanghai, Bangalore, Delhi, and Hyderabad.
The emergence of these kinds of multiple innovation clusters underlies the geographic
dispersion of innovation.
Finally, it is important to distinguish between “home-base-exploiting” and “home-base-
augmenting” overseas R&D labs.
31 “Home-base-exploiting” overseas R&D has been around
for a long time. Its raison d’etre is to adapt technology developed at the company’s home
base for commercialization in overseas markets. The key requirement for overseas R&D is
the adaptation of products, services, and production processes to local needs and resource
endowments. 
By contrast, “home-base-augmenting” overseas R&D has become considerably more
important during the last decades of the 20th century. Its rationale is “external knowledge







local innovation clusters, transferring that knowledge back to the home base,
32 and combining
these diverse technologies to create new products and processes.
33 Hence, augmenting overseas
R&D requires far more than adaptive engineering. It includes product development as well
as applied and fundamental research.
DRIVING FORCES
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Institutional change through liberalization has played an important role in reducing
constraints on the organizational and geographical mobility of innovation. Liberalization
includes four main elements: trade, capital flows, foreign direct investment (FDI), and
privatization. These different forms of liberalization are related to each other. Trade
liberalization typically sparks an expansion of trade and FDI, which, in turn, increases
demand for cross-border capital flows. This increases pressure for liberalization of capital
markets, which forces more and more countries to open their capital accounts. More open
capital accounts, in turn, encourage liberalization of FDI and privatization tournaments. 
The overall effect of liberalization has been to reduce the cost and risks of international
transactions and to increase international liquidity considerably. Global corporations have
been the primary beneficiaries. Liberalization provides them with:
1.  A greater range of choices for market entry, be it via trade, licensing, subcontracting,
and franchising (locational specialization);
2.  Better access to external resources and capabilities that they may need to complement
their core competencies (outsourcing); and 
3.  Fewer constraints on the geographic dispersion of the value chain (spatial mobility). 
Hence, liberalization has acted as a powerful catalyst for the expansion of global production
and innovation networks.
Technology, especially the rapid development and diffusion of information and
communication technology (IT), has also increased the mobility of innovation. The high
cost and risk of developing IT have forced companies to search for lower-cost locations for
R&D. Equally important is that IT and related organizational innovations provide effective
mechanisms for constructing flexible network arrangements that can link together and
coordinate economic transactions among geographically dispersed locations.
35 IT-enabled
network management reduces the cost of communication, helps to codify knowledge
through software tools and databases, enables remote control, and facilitates exchange of
tacit knowledge through audio-visual media. 
This has substantially reduced the friction of time and space not only for sales and
production, but also for R&D and other innovative activities. IT-enabled network manage-
ment has facilitated the exchange of knowledge among diverse knowledge communities at
distant locations that work together on an innovation project. In essence, IT has fostered the
development of leaner and more agile production and innovation networks that cut across
firm boundaries and national borders.
Liberalization and IT have drastically changed the dynamics of competition and industrial
organization. Competition now cuts across national borders. A firm’s position in one country
is no longer independent from its position in other countries.








all major growth markets (dispersion). It also must integrate its activities on a worldwide scale
in order to exploit and coordinate linkages between these different locations (integration).
In addition, competition cuts across sector boundaries and market segments. Mutual raiding
of established market segment fiefdoms has become the norm, making it more difficult for
firms to identify market niches and to grow with them.
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VERTICAL SPECIALIZATION
To cope with the growing complexity of competition, global companies have had to adjust
their strategies and organization. No firm, not even a dominant market leader, can generate
all the different capabilities internally that are necessary to cope with the requirements of
global competition. 
Competitive success critically depends on “vertical specialization.” Global firms selectively
“outsource” certain capabilities from specialized suppliers and they “offshore” them to new,
lower-cost locations. 
While vertical specialization initially focused on final assembly and lower-end component
manufacturing, increasingly it is being pushed into higher-end value-chain stages, including
product development and research. To make this happen, global firms have had to adopt
collective forms of organization, shifting from the multidivisional (M-form) functional
hierarchy to the networked global flagship model.
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The electronics industry has become an important breeding ground for this new industrial
organization model.* A massive process of vertical specialization has segmented an erstwhile
vertically integrated industry into closely interacting horizontal layers.
39 Until the early
1980s, IBM personified “vertical integration.” Almost all ingredients necessary to design,
produce, and commercialize computers remained internal to the firm. This was true for
semiconductors, hardware, operating systems, application software, and sales and distribution. 
Since then, however, vertical specialization has become the industry’s defining
characteristic.
40 Many activities that a computer company used to handle internally are now
being farmed out to multiple layers of specialized suppliers. This has given rise to rapid
market segmentation and to an ever-finer specialization within each of the above value-chain
stages. As firms accumulate experience in managing global distribution and production
networks and learn from successes and failures in inter-firm collaboration, they have been
able to expand vertical specialization. 
These adjustments were especially important in the choice of product and process
specialization, investment funding, and human resources management. They feed into each
other so that small changes in any of them require adjustments in all the other aspects of the
business model.
IBM’s transformation during the 1990s from a hardware producer to a supplier of
“integrated solutions” services is emblematic of adjustments in product and process
specialization. While the share of revenues from hardware declined from 48 percent in 1996
Many activities that
a computer company
used to handle itself
are now farmed out
to layers of specialized
suppliers
* The biotech sector of pharmaceuticals, however, has made the most progress pushing vertical specialization
into research and development. Ray Hill, a senior R&D manager at Merck, estimates that “99 percent of
the world’s bio-medical research takes place outside our [big pharmaceutical company] research labs.” See
“Change of Culture: How Big Pharma is Picking the Best of Biotech as a Sector Starts to Mature,”
Financial Times, January 12, 2006.15
to 32 percent in 2003, the share of services rose from 29 percent to 48 percent. IBM’s shift
out of hardware into services provided a powerful catalyst for similar attempts by other
leading global electronics firms.*
The spread of venture capital and related regulatory changes in the financial sector
drastically changed corporate strategies of investment funding.† U.S. venture capital firms
have provided access to a massive infusion of capital from U.S. pension funds as well as
hands-on industrial expertise. As a result, start-up companies in the electronics industry
have been able to raise capital for high-risk innovation projects. At the same time, global
industry leaders increasingly have used stock to attract and retain global talent and to
acquire innovative start-up companies.
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Both changes in investment funding have led to far-reaching changes in corporate
governance. Investment decisions are now primarily oriented toward servicing shareholder
requirements. As described below, this has drastically changed the parameters for innovation
management. As electronics firms increasingly rely on stock and venture capital, they are
under growing pressure to expand productivity and commercialize the resulting intellectual
property rights (IPR) as quickly as possible.
In addition, the electronics industry has seen a dramatically diminished commitment to
long-term employment. As a result, there has been a substantial increase in the inter-firm
and geographical mobility of labor, especially for highly skilled engineers, scientists, and
managers. In the United States, the emergence of a “high-velocity labor market” 
42 for IT
skills is driven by the proliferation of start-up companies, a drastic increase in the recruitment
of highly educated foreigners, and the spread of lavish incentives (such as stock options) to
induce job-hopping. 
These practices have increased the cost of employing IT workers in the United States.
For instance, between 1993 and 1999, computer scientists and mathematicians experienced
the highest salary growth (37 percent) of all U.S. occupations.
43 Average real annual earnings
of full-time employees in California’s software industry rose from $80,000 in 1994 to
$180,000 in 2000, only to fall drastically to below $100,000 in 2002 after the bursting of
the “New Economy” bubble. 
But even in the midst of the IT industry recession, employees in the U.S. IT industry
continued to earn, on average, far more than workers in most other sectors of the economy,
and between five and ten times more than their counterparts in Asia (outside of Japan). In
2002, the average annual wage in the U.S. IT industry was $67,440 ($99,440 in the software
industry), compared with $36,250 in all private-sector industries.
44 This has created a
powerful catalyst for U.S. IT firms to increase their overseas investment in R&D to tap into









* Dell remained an important exception with its single-minded focus on perfecting low-cost production and
supply chain management for commodity-type products. But Dell is now under pressure to adjust its
business model.
† Important complementary changes in U.S. financial institutions include the launch of NASDAQ in 1971
(making it much easier for start-up firms to go public), the passage of legislation in 1978 that reduced
capital gains tax from 49 percent to 28 percent, and the 1979 decree by the Department of Labor that
pension fund money could be invested not only in listed stocks and high-grade bonds but also in more
speculative assets, including new ventures.16
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Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Scattering the Seeds of Innovation: The Globalization of Research and Development. A white paper prepared for
Scottish Development International, London, 2004.
CHANGES IN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT 
The above transformations in strategy and organization have provoked fundamental changes
in innovation management and further enhanced the mobility of innovation. There is a
transition under way toward more open corporate innovation systems based on increasing
vertical specialization of innovation. 
Corporate innovation management must address four tasks simultaneously: (1) to
develop innovative capabilities (including R&D);* (2) to recruit and retain educated and
experienced knowledge workers; (3) to develop and adjust innovation process management
(methodologies, organization, and routines) in order to improve efficiency and time-to-
market; and (4) to match all three tasks with the corporation’s business model. 
The challenge is that no firm, not even a global market leader like IBM, can mobilize
all the diverse resources, capabilities, and bodies of knowledge internally. As a consequence,
both the sources and the use of knowledge have become increasingly externalized. Firms
now must supplement the in-house creation of new knowledge and capabilities with
external-knowledge sourcing strategies. There are strong pressures to reduce in-house basic
and applied research and to focus primarily on product development and the absorption of
external knowledge.
45
No longer does this externalization of innovation stop at the national border. Firms
increasingly need to tap sources of knowledge that are located overseas.
46 The result is that
GINs cut across sectors and national borders.
47 According to the most recent Science and
Engineering Indicators report by the U.S. National Science Board, “the speed, complexity,
and multidisciplinary nature of scientific research, coupled with the increased relevance of
science and the demands of a globally competitive environment, have … encouraged an
Access to 24/7 global R&D processes
*Percent of executives responding “very” or “critically important.”
Higher volume of innovation
Reduced R&D costs
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Reduced time to market for innovations
Ability to tailor goods and services to
particular markets
Ability to exploit pools of skilled labor
* “Innovative capabilities” are defined as the skills, knowledge, and management techniques needed to design,
produce, improve, and commercialize “artifacts,” i.e., products, services, machinery, and processes. 
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innovation system increasingly characterized by networking and feedback among R&D
performers, technology users, and their suppliers and across industries and national
boundaries.”
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IBM provides a telling example of this transformation from “closed” to more “open”
corporate innovation systems. IBM pushed vertical integration to the extreme when it
decided in 1964 to bet its future on the development of the 360 family as the global
standard for mainframe computers. The computer giant internalized practically all stages
of the value chain. It developed the basic components, assembled them into subsystems,
designed systems out of these components, manufactured the systems at its own factories,
distributed and serviced the systems themselves, and even handled the financing of the
systems.
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Various forces have shaped IBM’s decision to open its innovation system. The recession
of the early 1990s brutally exposed the weaknesses of a “closed” system. For the first time
since 1946, the company in 1991–93 experienced three years of declining revenues, shrinking
profit margins, and deficits totaling $15.9 billion. 
In response, IBM pursued a strategy of transforming itself from a hardware producer to
a supplier of integrated solutions. The objective of this strategy was to leverage IBM’s broad
portfolio of intellectual property rights, not only to exclude rival firms, but also to generate
new and highly profitable sources of growth. To deliver the best solutions, IBM had to
transcend its own R&D by seeking the best technologies and combining diverse technologies
into effective integrated solutions. The company’s decision to adopt open standards in a
variety of areas, including the Linux OS, the Java programming language, HTML, and http
protocols facilitated this strategic shift.
IBM realized that it no longer was realistic to try to tightly control use of its
component technologies since abundant specialized knowledge had dispersed to other
companies and countries. The company substantially reduced the intensity of its R&D.
IBM’s share of R&D in sales declined from an annual average of 9.84 percent during the
1983 to 1992 period, to an average of 6 percent during the 1994 to 2003 period (IBM
annual reports).
50
The company instead shifted the focus of innovation management to technology
licensing. Since 1993, IBM has been the leader in U.S. patent applications. In 1990,
by comparison, it ranked ninth.
51 Licensing has proved to be more profitable than sales.
IBM’s licensing revenues grew from $30 million in 1990 to $1 billion in 1998. This
amounts to about $750,000 per patent and 10 percent of IBM’s net profits. “To generate
equivalent profits, it is estimated that IBM would have to sell $20 billion in goods and
services.”
52 In 2001, IBM received $1.9 billion in royalty payments (amounting to 17
percent of its pre-tax revenues). In comparison, it spent $600 million on basic research
during the same year. 
IBM’s move toward a more open and networked innovation system has culminated in a
web of international R&D alliances aimed at accelerating progress in semiconductor technology,
developing new applications for its “Power” microprocessor, and generating new markets for
its computer equipment and IT services. Industry experts anticipate that IBM’s decision to
undertake joint R&D and to share capital expenditures with companies that possess
complementary capabilities—e.g., Singapore-based Chartered, AMD, Sony, Toshiba,









producing leading-edge integrated circuits.* Through its “Power.Org” alliance for open
business interface standards, IBM has sought to motivate vendors of electronic equipment
(especially servers, handsets, and digital consumer electronics) to develop new applications
for IBM’s “Power” microprocessor architecture. 
Interestingly, the “Power.Org” alliance was unveiled in Beijing. The explicit objective was
to exploit the huge potential for new applications in the rapidly growing Asian IT markets,
particularly in China. According to one well-placed observer, IBM’s objective “is not to sell
chips but to sell the knowledge and technology needed to help overseas [i.e., Chinese]
companies make their own chips and integrate Power into their own products … IBM
opens Power to stake its claim overseas and get relief from confining U.S. trade policies.”
53
This implies that IBM’s “open innovation system” strategy is seeking to bypass constraints
on the development of Asian innovation capabilities caused by restrictive U.S. policies on
technology exports of leading-edge microprocessor technology. To the degree that such
“open innovation” strategies will strengthen local innovative capabilities, they are likely to
facilitate the future expansion of innovation offshoring.
GLOBAL MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY 
The example of IBM shows that in an open innovation system both the source and the use
of knowledge can be external. The firm can create ideas for external and internal use, and it
can access ideas from outside and from within. Firms have been able to move to an open
innovation system because an increasing division of labor in innovation has given rise to
global markets for technology.
54 Global firms can now outsource knowledge needed to
complement their internally generated knowledge. Furthermore, they can elect to license
their technology and, hence, enhance the rents from innovation.
There is now much greater scope for external technology sourcing. Global markets for
technology imply that a firm’s competitive success critically depends on its ability to monitor
and quickly seize external sources of knowledge.
55 As demonstrated by Iansiti and West, a
company can leverage basic or generic technologies developed elsewhere.
56 This allows it to
focus on developing unique applications that better suit the needs of specific overseas markets.
Industry leaders can now balance in-house innovation and external knowledge sourcing. 
But external knowledge sourcing also can provide a shortcut for late entrants from Asia.
For instance, Asian companies that trail behind industry leaders in their in-house technological
capabilities can now use external technology sourcing to enhance their in-house innovative
capabilities.
57
Markets for technology also create new opportunities for appropriating innovation rents
through technology licensing. The underlying assumption is that once markets for technology
exist, one can codify knowledge sufficiently and develop well-defined and protective intellectual
property rights.
58 However, an excessive reliance on technology licensing may be risky








* A company typically needs $3-4.5 billion to establish a factory (“fab”) that is capable of producing chips
from 12-inch wafers with 90-nanometer process technology. For a leading-edge system-on-chip design,
development costs can be as high as $50-80 million.19
EVOLVING GLOBAL MARKETS FOR KNOWLEDGE WORKERS
The growing availability of knowledge workers outside the dominant corporations and
their increasing geographical mobility have been equally important for the gradual open-
ing of corporate innovation systems. This first happened in the United States after World
War II owing to the influence of the G.I. bill. In Europe, Marshall aid for reconstruction
and later rounds of EU enlargement expanded the market for knowledge workers. After
1970, the same trend appeared in Japan, and in the newly industrializing economies of
East Asia. As demonstrated in Part I, the supply of knowledge workers suitable for work
in global corporations now is growing substantially in Asia’s leading electronics exporting
countries.
The result is an evolving global market for knowledge workers, which has created
vast new talent sources. At the urging of American business, the U.S. government
responded to changes in the knowledge worker market by allowing greater immigration
of foreign students and professionals, especially for science and engineering (S&E). Until
the turn of the century, the United States was the main beneficiary of the globalization of
knowledge workers. The U.S. share of the world’s S&E workforce was “disproportionately
high” during the second half of the 20th century.
60 It reached its peak during the 1970s
when more than 30 percent of the world’s tertiary-level students were enrolled in U.S.
universities. These institutions granted more than 50 percent of S&E doctorates during
that period. 
A 1998 NSF study showed that more than 50 percent of the post-doctoral students at
MIT and Stanford were not U.S. citizens and that more than 30 percent of computer
professionals in Silicon Valley were born outside the United States.
61 Data from the 2000
U.S. Census show that in S&E occupations, approximately 17 percent of bachelor’s degree
holders, 29 percent of master’s degree holders, and 38 percent of doctorate holders were
foreign born. 
This has enabled U.S. start-up companies to pursue “learning-by-hiring away”
strategies. They could rapidly ramp up complex innovation projects with highly
experienced personnel that were trained by other corporations or countries. But the
main beneficiaries were major global U.S. firms that were able to reduce the cost of
research, product development, and engineering by shifting from national to global
recruitment strategies. 
A recent report prepared by a leading U.S. education economist for the National Bureau
of Economic Research argues that a powerful economic rationale is driving the increasing
reliance of U.S. firms and universities on foreign-born students and employees—they want
to reduce the costs of hiring scientists and engineers. The report states that an increase in
the supply of immigrant S&E workers “will, all else the same, reduce earnings and
employment opportunities below what they otherwise would have been.”
62
Over the last few years, the United States has faced new challenges in global markets for
knowledge workers. The shift to knowledge-intensive industries has increased the importance
and scarcity of well-trained knowledge workers. At the same time, aging populations are
reducing the available workforce in the United States and, with the exception of India, in
Asia’s leading exporting countries. As a result, the growth of global markets for knowledge
workers is likely to slow down. This implies that over the next decade or so U.S. electronics
Data from the
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firms will find it increasingly difficult to attract—and retain—enough qualified workers,
especially scientists and engineers.*
Yet, other causes are self-inflicted. For instance, deteriorating earnings and employment
opportunities that result from increased immigration have drastically reduced the incentives
for U.S.-born citizens and residents to become scientists and engineers. These privileged
social groups have access to alternative careers, such as financial analysts, lawyers, and certain
medical professions. The latter provide better earnings and employment opportunities than
S&E careers.
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Intensifying competition for knowledge workers also reflects negative side effects of the
aforementioned changes in corporate strategy. For instance, in their quest to improve return-
on-investment (ROI), leading U.S. electronics firms have increased the use of temporary
workers and have outsourced so-called non-core activities. The resultant downsizing of
permanent work forces has increased the vulnerability of these companies to sudden shifts
in demand. 
Some global corporations pushed downsizing to the limits, especially after 2000. In the
words of one expert, “they’re running themselves so lean that if they get a little sand in their
gears, the whole organization breaks down.”
64 If demand shifts to new product generations
that require new technologies, these firms must then search for specialized talent to fill the
gaps caused by previous rounds of downsizing. As a result, crisis management has become
the dominant concern of human resources managers.
U.S. corporations are responding to the intensifying competition for scarce global talent
“by opening high-technology operations in foreign locations, developing strategic international
alliances, and consummating cross-national spin-offs and mergers.”
65 For many high-tech
companies, competing for scarce global talent has become a major strategic concern. As a
result, global sourcing for knowledge workers now is as important as global manufacturing
and supply chain strategies. The goal is to diversify and optimize a company’s human capital
portfolio through aggressive recruitment in global labor markets. 
Since the turn of the century, most leading U.S. electronics firms have moved R&D and
engineering overseas, especially to populous countries like China and India that have emerged
as important new sources of lower-cost S&E students and workers.† The demand for
“bottleneck skills,” such as experienced design engineers for analog integrated circuits, has
led to global “auction markets” for knowledge workers. These “auctions” enable knowledge
workers to sell their talents to the highest bidder. 
Overall, however, the emergence of a global market for knowledge workers seems to
have kept a tight cap on increases in remuneration.
66 This is because the leading global
electronics firms can tap this market for workers who are readily available for hire and need
not require extensive internal training or the inducement of lifelong employment.
Global sourcing
for knowledge





* With the important exception of India, aging populations in China and other leading Asian exporting countries
may constrain Asia’s future supply of low-cost knowledge workers. In China, one of the by-products of the
one-child policy is that in a decade or so many more people will be retiring than entering the workforce. In
contrast, India is one of the few countries in which the working-age population is projected to grow for the
next 40 years or so, keeping wages low. See Jackson and Howe, The Graying of the Middle Kingdom.
† Top U.S. research universities are now moving somewhat belatedly to these new locations in order to tap
into the rapidly growing new markets for higher education.21
By the same token, this market can be highly volatile and pose substantial risks. At
any time, demand for knowledge workers may outstrip supply in some locations and
supply will exceed demand in other locations. Especially for more senior and experienced
engineers and project managers, demand continues to overshoot supply in Asia’s major
offshore locations. 
In China, for instance, there is a paucity of line managers and project managers well
versed in implementing state-of-the-art management approaches. Competition for scarce
talent (especially in science and engineering) has intensified, as large Chinese companies,
such as Lenovo and Huawei, are now seriously competing for the best talent.* In India, it is
less of a problem finding experienced line and project managers owing to India’s long-established
links with the United States and the roles played by nonresident Indians. But turnover
rates are extremely high, and global firms are facing serious problems in establishing effective
control and efficient processes.
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The volatility of global markets for knowledge workers reflects a fundamental characteristic
of innovation offshoring—its geographic dispersion remains concentrated in a handful of
new clusters. This tends to prematurely exhaust the limited supply of suitable engineers,
giving rise to severe bouts of localized wage inflation and excessive turnover rates for key
personnel. Global corporations are forced to constantly readjust and rebalance their location
decisions and network management strategies and to continuously search for and experiment
with new locations. 
As a result, companies that have accumulated some experience in innovation offshoring
are now shifting from “labor-cost arbitrage” to strategies to reduce the extremely high turnover
and retain scarce talent. In fact, in well-established offshore locations in Bangalore or Shanghai
global firms now are willing to conduct “exciting” R&D projects that can attract the best
and brightest of the local talent pool. 
At the same time, global firms are constantly seeking to identify new offshore locations
with lower-cost populations of knowledge workers, such as lower-tier cities in China and
India, or new locations in Vietnam, Romania, Armenia, and Slovakia. But to develop these
new locations, global firms must invest in the training of local knowledge workers.†
IMPLICATIONS FOR INNOVATION OFFSHORING
In essence, innovation offshoring reflects the recognition by incumbent market leaders that
there is simply no way to prevent knowledge diffusion. Even the most aggressive attempts to
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* Until recently, managers working for global corporations could earn 50 percent more than managers working
for local Chinese companies. Now, however, leading Chinese companies offer competitive remuneration
packages and aggressively headhunt Chinese managers employed at global firms.
† This is somewhat ironic in light of the fact that the same firms are less willing to invest in training in the
United States. But it is less puzzling in view of the fact that global firms often seek government support for
training. The intensifying incentive tournaments among competing offshore locations suggest that they are
quite successful in securing training assistance.
‡ “Black box” technologies are defined as technologies “that cannot be easily imitated by competitors because
they are: (1) protected under intellectual property rights, such as patents; (2) made of complex materials,
processes, and know-how that cannot be copied; or (3) made using unique production methods, systems,
or control technologies” (Ernst, “Searching,” 183).22
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explains why global firms now prefer to exploit the diffusion of knowledge, rather than
fight rearguard battles to protect against the leakage of knowledge. 
There are important additional advantages. For instance, innovation offshoring helps
global firms to hedge against failures of internal R&D projects or against slippage in capacity
expansion. Innovation offshoring also makes it possible to multiply opportunities for
technology diversification. There is a choice between “building-or-buying” new business
lines. Furthermore, global firms can accelerate the speed of the innovation cycle and reduce
the very high fixed cost of investing in internal R&D.
The transition to open innovation networks has changed the way in which global
corporations are using their overseas R&D centers in Asia. A recent study about R&D
investment in China by major international companies illustrates this point.
68 The study
emphasizes that while cost savings matter, global firms are expanding their R&D in China
primarily for strategic reasons. They want to tap into the vast pool of talent and ideas in
order to stay abreast of competitors in the increasingly sophisticated markets of China and Asia.
The Industrial Research Institute (IRI),* which conducted the study, predicts a substantial
increase in innovation offshoring in China. IRI argues that the focus of overseas R&D labs
is shifting from support and adaptation to the sourcing of China’s emerging technologies
and talent pools.
The following taxonomy helps to capture the evolution of R&D labs established by
global electronics firms in China. “Satellite” R&D labs, the least developed type of lab,
combine elements of “home-base-exploiting” and “home-base-augmenting” R&D. These
labs are of relatively low strategic importance, as evidenced by their vulnerability to budget
cuts decided by headquarters. 
“Contract” R&D labs describe the pure-play version of “innovation offshore outsourcing.”
For these labs, China’s role is confined to the provision of lower-cost skills, capabilities, and
infrastructure. While dense information flows link these labs with R&D teams at headquarters
and other affiliates, knowledge exchange remains tightly controlled and highly unequal. 
The highest stage, “(more) equal partnership” labs, is reserved for those R&D labs of
global firms that are charged with a regional or global product mandate. For these labs,
barriers to knowledge exchange are supposed to be much lower and may eventually give
way to full-fledged mutual knowledge exchange.
Recent research documents that satellite and contract R&D labs continue to dominate.
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However, there are also examples of (more) equal partnership arrangements, especially related
to the development of China’s alternative standards in mobile telecommunications, open
source software, and digital consumer electronics.
70
In short, innovation offshoring results from fundamental changes in business organization.
“Vertical specialization” is no longer restricted to the production of goods and services. It
now extends to all stages of the value chain, including research and new product development.
Over the years, this process has taken on an increasingly international dimension, the result
being that corporate innovation management can “integrate distinctive knowledge from
around the world as effectively as global supply chains integrate far-flung sources of raw
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* Members of the Industrial Research Institute (IRI) include more than 240 leading global manufacturing
firms that perform more than two-thirds of the industrial R&D in the United States.23
In other words, global firms construct global innovation networks to improve the
productivity of R&D by accessing knowledge from cheaper, non-traditional locations. As
the number of specialized suppliers of innovation modules increases, this provides a powerful
boost to the organizational and geographical mobility of innovation. Global firms are now
seeking to integrate geographically dispersed innovation clusters into global networks of
production, engineering, development, and research. 
Since the turn of the century, these networks have been extended to emerging new
innovation clusters, especially in Asia. This trend is expected to provide global firms with a
powerful new source of competitive advantage because they can now quickly generate more
and higher-value innovation at lower cost.
C ASE S TUDYO NC HIP D ESIGN
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The recent expansion of chip design in (non-Japan) Asia provides an interesting test case for
the study of innovation offshoring. From practically nothing during the mid-1990s, Asia’s
share of chip design shot up to around 30 percent in 2002.* Taiwan has emerged as an
important new location, with South Korea following closely behind. Chip design is growing
rapidly in China and India, as well as in Singapore and Malaysia. 
CHIP DESIGN MOVES TO ASIA
Chip design activities are typically divided into routine functions (“design implementation”)
and stages of design that center on conceptualization (“system specification”). Providers of
design services and, more recently, providers of electronic manufacturing services focus
primarily on implementing designs. This reflects long experience in board-level design that
goes back to the early 1980s,
73 but today covers very complex multilayer boards. 
Asian firms possess a broad portfolio of design implementation capabilities owing to the
experience they have accumulated in board-level design and fabrication of integrated circuits.
For Taiwanese design houses, in particular, design implementation remains an important
strategic focus. They compete on the speed, cost, flexibility, and quality of such services.
But there are also strong incentives for Asian firms to develop “system specification”
capabilities. Such capabilities are necessary to reap innovation rents via premium pricing.
In addition, “system specification” is a key element of strategies to develop global brands. 
As mentioned, Taiwanese design houses have sought to distinguish themselves as suppliers
of design building blocks, the so-called SIPs. However, global industry leaders like Intel and
Texas Instruments are the main drivers behind the development of “system specification”
capabilities in Asia. They are conducting cutting-edge integrated chip development projects
in some of their Asian R&D centers. In addition, Asia’s leading system companies, especially
* Of course, this is still far smaller than North America’s share of 60 percent. However, Asia is the fastest
growing market for electronic design automation (EDA) tools, growing 36 percent in the first quarter of
2004, compared with 5 percent growth in North America, 4 percent in Europe, and 2 percent in Japan.
(See EDA Consortium, Market Statistics Service Survey, August 2004 and iSuppli, China’s Fabless Firms
Race Beyond Foundation Stage.)24
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from China and South Korea, are producing innovations in the design of complex system
architectures,* primarily for wireless telecommunication systems.
Design complexity has also improved in terms of (1) the line-width of process technology,
measured in nanometers; (2) the use of analog and mixed-signal design, which are
substantially more complex than digital design; (3) the share and type of system-level
design, such as system-on-chip, system-in package, structured ASICs; and (4) the number
of gates used in these designs. The primary carriers of complex design projects are offshore
R&D centers established by global semiconductor firms, foundry service providers, and
design houses. 
A few leading Asian firms from China, India, South Korea, and Taiwan are conducting
design projects at the technology frontier. By nationality, South Korean and Taiwanese firms
generate the most complex designs. Chinese telecommunications equipment vendors also
produce complex designs. The rest of the Asian sample firms are at least one generation
behind the cutting edge in design complexity. They are positioning themselves as fast, but
cheaper followers. 
DRIVERS OF CHIP DESIGN OFFSHORING
What forces are driving the offshoring of chip design to Asia? As mentioned earlier, supply-
oriented forces attract global firms. The cost of employing a chip design engineer in Asia is
typically between 10 and 20 percent of the cost of employing a design engineer in Silicon
Valley.†
Demand factors are equally important, however. Global firms emphasize the importance
of having design capabilities close to the rapidly growing and increasingly sophisticated
Asian markets for communications, computing, and digital consumer equipment. They also
want to be able to interact with Asia’s leading users of novel or enhanced products or services.
If China succeeds in setting alternative standards for 3G mobile communications, for
example, global firms will have to locate chip design in Beijing to address the specific
requirements of such standards.
To penetrate Asia’s growth markets, semiconductor giants like Intel and system companies
like IBM have tried to expand their “platform leadership” strategies across the region.‡ For
mobile communication systems, IBM and other major system companies are expanding
their Asian chip design centers to establish their own “platform” designs as de facto standards
in the region. 
Global firms emphasize that Asian policies, such as the provision of low-cost but high-








* “Architecture” refers to “the partitioning of the … [computer] system into components of a given scope and
related to each other functionally and physically through given interfaces. From a given architecture flows
the design of components’ functions and how they relate to each other.” Gawer and Cusumano, Platform
Leadership, 18.
† These costs comparisons include salary, benefits, equipment, office space, and other infrastructure.
‡ The overriding purpose of “platform leadership” strategies is to leverage the existing market power of indus-
try leaders into the control of “systemic architectural innovations” (Gawer and Cusumano, Platform
Leadership, 39). For example, Intel has attempted to extend its control over microprocessors by creating
widely accepted architectural designs that increase the processing requirements of electronic systems and,
hence, the market for Intel’s microprocessors. 25
design to particular locations.
74 On the negative side, global firms are concerned about
obscure and unpredictably changing regulations and weak IPR protection in Asia. 
Asian governments played a powerful catalytic role for indigenous industry by establishing
critical infrastructure, support industries, and design capabilities that enabled firms to invest
in and upgrade chip design.
75 Some Asian firms maintain that diverse government policies
and regulations have shaped peculiar features of product and factor markets. For example,
differences in Asian financial markets have created diverse approaches to investment finance
that have influenced the volume and direction of chip design investment. Taiwanese firms
that rely primarily on equity have reported that they feel pressured to produce high margins
so they can upgrade their design capabilities.*
Finally, Asian firms emphasize that progress in chip design owes much to concerted
efforts by both governments and leading Asian companies to establish new sources of
innovation and global standards. In the telecommunications sector, China’s attempt to
develop an alternative third generation (3G) digital wireless standard (TD-SCDMA) also
has created a powerful motivation for global and Asian firms to expand their chip design
activities in that country.
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT
But how can global firms design chips at multiple locations, particularly given the extraordinary
complexity of the design process? And how can design teams exchange complex design
knowledge across borders and from distant locations with different levels of economic
development? The answers to these questions may be found by examining changes in
innovation management that affect the methodology and organization of chip design.
Until the mid-1980s, global system companies and semiconductor firms did almost all
their chip design in-house. Vertical integration focused on the design of an individual component
to be inserted on a printed circuit board. Since the mid-1990s, however, there has been an
upheaval in chip design methodology† owing to intensifying pressures to improve design
productivity combined with increasingly demanding performance features of electronic systems. 
“System-on-chip” (SoC) design combines “modular design”‡ and design automation to
move design from the individual component on a printed circuit board closer to “system-
level integration” on a chip.
76 SoC design has fostered vertical specialization in project
execution, enabling firms to disintegrate the design value chain as well as to disperse it
geographically. This gave rise to complex, multilayered global design networks (GDNs)
with variable configurations. For instance, an embedded microcontroller for a mobile
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disperse it
geographically
* Taiwanese firms develop “slightly more complex designs on average at slightly higher design productivity
rates” than Chinese firms. (V. Nanda, “IC Design House Survey 2003,” www.eettaiwan.com/, accessed
February 5, 2006.) However, even these relatively small differences in design complexity and productivity
can provide very substantial rewards. Taiwanese design houses were paid roughly three times as much as
their Chinese counterparts.
† “Design methodology” is the sequence of steps by which a design process will reliably produce a design
“as close as possible” to the design target, while maintaining feasibility with respect to constraints. 
‡ “Modular design” is a particular design methodology in which parameters and tasks are interdependent
within units (modules) and independent across them.26
EAST-WEST CENTER
Three GDN layers can be distinguished:
1.  The network core encompasses five strategic groups of firms. A “system company” (like
IBM) defines the concept, but may well outsource everything else. SoC design may take
place within the “system company,” an integrated global semiconductor firm (like Intel),
or a fabless design house (like Xilinx), or a combination of these. Chip fabrication and
assembly also may be outsourced to specialized suppliers. 
2.  A secondary GDN layer consists of suppliers of tools for electronic design automation
(EDA), verification, and chip testing. This layer also includes SIP licensors and design
implementation services. 
3.  A third layer may involve system contract manufacturers, such as Flextronics or Taiwan’s
Foxconn.
Initially, vertical specialization loosened the bonds between design and fabrication. This
process started with ASIC (application-specific integrated circuit) design, where the goal
was to avoid the high cost and time required to design a full-custom chip.* The Taiwan
Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), established in 1987, was an important
catalyst. TSMC provides contract chip fabrication (“silicon foundry”) services for “fabless”
design houses that outsource chip fabrication and target specialized niche markets. Until the
early 1990s, GDNs were centered on the well-known symbiotic fabless/foundry relationship,
and hence retained a relatively simple structure. 
Over time, however, vertical specialization has increased the number and variety of
network participants, business models, and design interfaces, bringing together design
teams from companies that drastically differ in size, market power, location, and nationality.
A SoC design network described in one interview included the following participants: 
n A Chinese system company defined the system architecture;
n A Taiwanese contract manufacturer produced the resulting electronic equipment;
n An American integrated global semiconductor firm provided a design platform; 
n A European firm provided an embedded processor as an important design building-block.
Additional network participants included:
n Fabless design houses from the United States and Taiwan;
n Silicon foundries from Taiwan, Singapore, and China;
n Chip-packaging companies from Taiwan and China;
n Tool vendors for design automation and testing from the United States and India; and 
n Design support service providers from various Asian countries.
Research indicates that geographic proximity can become a disadvantage when a particular
chip design project requires a large number of contributors with diverse knowledge sets and
capabilities. It can become increasingly costly to bring together a large group of very diverse
* An ASIC typically is composed of standard building blocks called “cells” that are designed to implement a
specific customer application.27
people at one location. When concentrated there, especially in the home country, such design
groups may become too powerful and constrain productivity growth. This potential dynamic
provides yet another strong rationale for global firms to offshore chip design to Asia.
SKILL REQUIREMENTS AND WORK ORGANIZATION
Skill requirements and work organization are of increasing importance as push factors for
design offshoring. Global firms emphasize that both the United States and Europe have
failed to train enough design engineers for the next technology generation, giving rise to a
serious “skill bottleneck.” More and more governments in Asia are pursuing policies to
increase the supply of well-educated and experienced design engineers. As a result, design
engineers in some Asian countries—especially Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia,
China, and India—are trained using the latest tools and methodologies. This has been
possible because of the emergence of a global market for service providers of education and
training for specialized bottleneck skills in engineering and management. 
Asia’s leading electronics exporting countries have been quick to develop their own
private and public design training institutions to accelerate the development of new
specialized chip and system design clusters. These training efforts are especially dynamic in
India and Northeast Asia. And these efforts have proved successful, attracting support from
leading EDA tool vendors. Once Asian designers have gained practical experience, this may
give them an advantage over designers in the traditional centers of design excellence in the
United States. 
Equally important, global chip design firms are under tremendous pressure to increase design
productivity and to accelerate time-to-market.
77 Hence, they are seeking to increase workloads
and cap the 1990s-era remuneration of design engineers. SoC designers now work “six days
per week, twelve hours per day, with intense pressures to meet the time-to-market requirements
for design.”
78 But as pressure grows in the United States to expense stock options, it is difficult
to see why designers would be willing to keep up with such health-destroying workloads. 
In Taiwan and China, however, that may be different. The income taxation systems in
those two countries enable individuals employed by semiconductor firms to receive company
stock and options but not be taxed to any significant degree if they choose to sell the stock.
As a result, Taiwanese and Chinese firms arguably “have a competitive advantage … with
respect to competition for talent that other firms cannot match.”*
KNOWLEDGE SHARING
Offshoring design projects to Asia’s new specialized electronics industry clusters poses very
demanding requirements for knowledge sharing. Not only are the Asian locations far away
geographically from Silicon Valley, but their stages of development and economic institutions
also differ substantially from the home country locations of global firms. There are vast









* In Taiwan and China, employees of semiconductor firms who have received stock as compensation are
taxed on the face value of the shares, not the market value. The latter is often many times higher than the
face value, given the rapid growth of semiconductor firms in both countries. See Howell et al., China’s
Emerging Semiconductor Industry.28
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regulatory systems. These differences complicate transactions and the knowledge exchange
required to support these transactions.
Thus, it will take time to develop robust and efficient forms of offshore chip design.
Transnational knowledge communities,
79 such as professional peer group networks, and
Asia’s large diaspora of skilled migrants and “IT mercenaries” will serve as important
“enabling” factors. Research shows that these networks help to facilitate the exchange of
complex design knowledge. Equally important, informal social networks can provide much
needed experience and links with markets and financial institutions. They also can help to
reverse the brain drain and bring back to Asia experienced project managers and engineers.
C ONCLUSIONS AND P OLICY S UGGESTIONS
Innovation offshoring poses a fundamental challenge to U.S. technology leadership,
economic growth, and prosperity. However, the United States still lacks a realistic long-term
strategy to respond to Asia’s rise as an important location for innovation offshoring. Policy
suggestions vacillate between fear—“hollowing-out of U.S technology leadership”—and
complacency—“U.S. technology leadership will always remain unchallenged.” 
The simple metaphor—Asia’s rise versus America’s decline—is clearly misleading. There
is no threat to U.S. technology leadership, at least for now. No serious observer would claim
that China, South Korea, India, Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia could soon overtake the
dominant centers of innovation in the United States, Europe, and Japan. Indeed, there is
ample evidence of a persistent U.S.-centric concentration of the sources of innovation:
n Since the late 20th century, American firms have raced ahead in the most prized areas of
technological innovation, as far as these can be measured by patent statistics. The U.S.
“innovation score” has more than doubled from 41 (in 1985) to almost 101 (in 2002),
a rate far better than for any other country.* In 2002, all 15 leading companies with the
best record on patent citations were based in the United States, with nine of them in the
electronics industry.
n The 700 largest R&D spenders, most of them large U.S. firms, dominate global R&D
spending. They are responsible for close to half of the world’s total R&D expenditures
and more than two-thirds of the world’s business R&D.
80
n More than 80 percent of the 700 largest R&D spenders come from only five countries —
first and foremost, the United States, followed by Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom,
and France. 
* The U.S. “innovation score” measures the number of patents granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO), multiplied by the so-called “citation index” that indicates the value of these patents. The
citation index measures the frequency of citation of a particular patent. When the PTO publishes patents,
each one includes a list of other patents from which it is derived. The more often a patent is cited, the more
likely it is a pioneering patent, connected with important inventions and discoveries. An index of more
than one indicates that patents are cited more often than would be expected for a specific group of
technologies, while less than one indicates they are cited less often than expected. F. Narin, Tech-Line
Background Paper and CHI/MIT, Report on “Innovation Scores” Survey, 2003 (www.CHI.com/ and
www.chiresearch.com/, accessed January 23, 2005; company acquired, site discontinued).29
Fundamental New Challenges Require New National Strategy
Nevertheless, there are reasons to expect a longer-term erosion of the U.S. leadership position.
There is a real danger that Asia’s rise as an important location for innovation offshoring may
challenge U.S. competitiveness in international trade and investment. It is thus time to
accept that the United States no longer is preordained to lead the world in innovation. 
It is also time to reconsider the tacit assumption that underlies much of U.S. policy-
making—that the IT industry will move offshore, including product development and
research, and that “the future is in biotech.”* Instead, U.S. policymakers should begin a
dialogue to develop a new, integrated national strategy on innovation. Such a strategy
requires input from all actors involved in innovation. These would include the producers
of new ideas (the knowledge workers), the corporations that provide high-risk financing to
translate ideas into innovations, the users of innovations, and governments. Ideally, the
dialogue would help to identify realistic policy responses to the following fundamental new
challenges:
1.  Talent pool: What policies and strategies can help the United States to compensate for
the loss of R&D employment and real income—especially in the electronics industry—
that results from innovation offshoring? 
2.  Markets: Can accelerating market growth in the new offshore locations in Asia compensate
U.S. firms for the slowdown in market growth that they are now facing in important
markets in the OECD core region?
3.  Innovative Capabilities: How can the United States avoid a hollowing-out of the
nation’s production and innovation system? What policies can help to contain the
leakage of essential intellectual property?
4.  National Research Priorities: In light of the vast untapped opportunities for break-
through innovations in information and communications technologies, what policies
can help to reestablish support for university research in areas like computer science
and electronic engineering?
5.  New Competitors: What policies will enable U.S. firms to cope with much more broad-
based competition from Asian companies that covers all stages of the innovation value
chain?
6.  Future Scenarios: Which of the following scenarios is likely to determine the future
U.S.-Asia division of labor in innovation?
• Hierarchical: The United States can sustain selective and tightly controlled off-
shoring of lower-end innovation tasks and capabilities;
• Complementary: U.S.-led global innovation networks combine system integration
capabilities in the United States with lower-cost offshore development of intellectual
property; or
* That assumption needs to be qualified in light of the substantial progress in biotechnology in countries as
diverse as China, India, Singapore, South Korea, Cuba, and Iran.30
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• Unequal interdependence: There will be coexistence of architectural innovations
and new standards developed both in the United States and in Asia, but the United
States will continue to shape the terms of interdependence.
The following generic policy suggestions highlight a few critical challenges for policymakers.
These suggestions are highly selective. Their main objective is to initiate an open debate
about how to reduce the economic and social costs of the massive adjustments that innovation
offshoring is likely to impose on the U.S. economy. 
1. IMPROVE DATA COLLECTION AND ACCESS
It is impossible to begin a national policy dialogue on innovation offshoring without
improving substantially collection of and access to data. However, there currently is an
extreme poverty of useful data. In fact, a recent report by the Committee on National
Statistics, prepared for the National Research Council, argues that, except for statistics on
formal R&D spending, patents, and some aspects of science and engineering education,
innovation-related data are extremely limited.
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Most importantly, there is a glaring lack of statistics about how many R&D jobs have
been offshored from the United States to Asia and in what industries. According to a recent
report prepared for the National Bureau of Economic Research, “the U.S. government does
not measure the number of jobs offshored.”
82 This makes it difficult to develop sound
government policies to deal with the negative impacts of innovation offshoring. 
It is time to develop robust and widely accessible databases on evolving global markets
for knowledge workers and the migration of science and engineering jobs. As innovation
offshoring cuts across multiple national borders, the collection of such data should be
entrusted to an international organization. 
One possibility would be to charge the OECD Secretariat with the creation and
maintenance of global databases. Based on the data collected, the OECD might then
propose policies governing the trade of skilled labor among countries. These efforts could
build upon established institutional arrangements for negotiating and regulating international
trade, finance, and intellectual property, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the
Bank of International Settlements (BIS), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
Policies should also reduce the negative side effects of otherwise well-meant regulatory
restrictions on information disclosure. An important example is the “Fair Disclosure”
regulation (Regulation FD). This regulation stipulates that corporations must release
market-sensitive information to all investors at the same time. It also foresees heavy fines if
information leaks out to other people.*
While the intention of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission was to improve
access to information on public companies for individual investors, the opposite has happened.
Companies have restricted communications because of a fear of violating Regulation FD.








* Individual company policies on the “fair disclosure” regulation (Regulation FD) are described on the
investor relations webpages found on the websites of most leading U.S. electronics firms.31
with analysts.
83 In short, the regulation has had a significant negative effect on the data
that one is able to collect. This seriously constrains research that is necessary to inform
policymaking.
2. ADDRESS ‘HOME-MADE’ CAUSES OF INNOVATION OFFSHORING
Many experts agree that U.S. policy responses to innovation offshoring should seek to sustain
and build on existing strengths of the U.S. innovation system. Specifically, Silicon Valley and
Route 128 are still among the best places to be for high-risk, knowledge-intensive innovation
activities. This is because such locations typically include a broad portfolio of support services
—including legal, finance, and property development—that facilitate rapid adjustments of
business models to changing requirements of markets and technology. These are also privileged
places to collect strategic market intelligence from the most demanding lead users. 
Additional strengths of the U.S. innovation system include (1) the presence of the world’s
leading research universities, (2) an unrivaled exposure to leading-edge management practices
for R&D projects, and (3) a high mobility of knowledge workers that facilitates quick and
relatively hassle-free knowledge diffusion.
However, there is also a growing recognition that important weaknesses of the U.S.
innovation system have acted as “home-made causes” of innovation offshoring. Two types of
policy responses—support policies for corporate innovation and policies to upgrade the U.S.
pool of knowledge workers—may help to ensure that the United States retains the best
environment for innovation. 
3. SUPPORT POLICIES FOR CORPORATE INNOVATION 
According to William Brody, president of Johns Hopkins University and co-chairman of the
U.S. Council on Competitiveness’s National Innovation Initiative, the United States is facing
a serious challenge: “We are losing our collective will to fund basic research … [which] has
failed to demonstrate a return on investment that satisfies the ravenous appetite of financial
markets for short-term earnings growth.”
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There is an obvious need for policies that facilitate the supply of risk-tolerant but patient
corporate innovation finance, whether through the venture capital business model or through
corporate venture capital. Policies to mobilize patient risk capital for innovation have focused
on the provision of tax incentives and on the protection of intellectual property rights. These
are legitimate concerns, but it is necessary to adjust such policies to the new requirements
posed by innovation offshoring.
Tax policies: Tax policies should link incentives to performance requirements and to early-
stage investments in innovative start-up companies. Good examples are the following
recommendations of the Council on Competitiveness: 
n “The federal government should provide a 25 percent tax credit for early stage invest-
ments when made through qualified angel funds. The individuals participating in these
funds would need to make a minimum investment of $50,000 each year in order to
receive the tax credit. Acceptable investments would be restricted to those that meet










n “Enact a permanent, restructured research and experimentation tax credit (the so-called
R&D tax credit) and extend the credit to research conducted in university-industry
consortia.”
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The United States also needs new policies that would help to counter new entry and exit
barriers for innovative start-up companies. One of the traditional attractions of the United
States, particularly Silicon Valley, was the start-up market. If talented engineers were laid off
or wanted to leave their company, they would have good opportunities to launch innovative
design companies that focus on market niches with high growth potential. 
These opportunities have shrunk substantially as a result of the brutal losses caused by
the bursting of the “Internet bubble.” Other factors, such as a substantial increase in the
minimum funding requirements, also have served to create a more hostile environment for
innovative start-up companies.
Intellectual property rights (IPR): Debates about IPR have focused on how to adjust U.S.
intellectual property rights policies to maximize incentives for the generation and broad
diffusion of innovations. The National Research Council studies on the reform of the U.S.
patent system recommended the following:
n Institute a post-grant open-review procedure for U.S. patents;
n Discontinue the practice of diverting patent application fees to general revenue and
provide the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office with sufficient resources to modernize
and improve performance; and 
n Leverage the patent database as an innovation tool.
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These measures are not enough. There are significant imperfections in the U.S. patent
system.
87 It is often costly to reap the benefits of IPRs, and small firms may face greater
difficulties than large corporations in patenting their inventions. 
Even more important is the so-called “anti-commons” problem.
88 It is unrealistic to
assume that each patent is associated with one innovation only. In complex technology
systems, innovation is systemic and cumulative, requiring many different pieces of knowledge,
some of which may be patented and owned by companies with conflicting interests.
Typically however, IPR protection is fragmented. The resulting constraints to innovation
can be substantial. For the inventor, the cost of “inventing around” blocking patents can be
extremely high. And the higher these costs, the weaker the innovator’s bargaining power in
licensing negotiations.
This raises two important but very tricky policy questions. How should different contributors
be rewarded? And who is likely to capture the most benefits? While institutional arrangements
for IPR protection matter, the outcome is primarily determined by bargaining power. This
suggests how difficult it would be to reform the U.S. IPR regime in a meaningful way. 
4. UPGRADE THE U.S. TALENT POOL OF KNOWLEDGE WORKERS
The United States must upgrade its talent pool of knowledge workers if it is to counter









n Provide incentives to increase the number of S&E graduates in the United States;
n Complement formal education in S&E with “soft” capabilities such as entrepreneurship,
knowledge integration, and multidisciplinary and cross-cultural management; and
n Encourage skilled foreigners to continue immigrating and reduce possible negative
impacts on U.S. knowledge workers. 
Provide incentives to study science and engineering: Increasing the number of S&E
graduates in the United States requires a multipronged approach.
89 There is bipartisan
support in Congress for a substantial increase in federal funding for basic research and for
scholarships in math, engineering, and science. President Bush outlined such plans in the
2006 State of the Union address under the rubric of “The American Competitiveness
Initiative.” If funded, the initiative would double R&D funding for universities at a cost of
$50 billion over the next 10 years and roughly $900 million in 2007. At this stage, however,
it is unclear whether Congress will appropriate sufficient resources to implement the plan
effectively.
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It is important for private business to join the government in bearing part of the burden
of this investment. Without a broad participation, it would be difficult to cope with the
substantial challenges of improving the American educational system. As Segal and Yochelson
rightly emphasize, “top-down federal spending alone will not win the race for global
leadership in science and technology. It will take a hands-on commitment from all involved
in the U.S. innovation enterprise to build world-class talent from the bottom-up …
[F]ederal dollars alone are unlikely to shape the career choices of American students.
Scholarships may be a factor for some, but they cannot trump market forces.”
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A senior product development engineer in Minneapolis, Minnesota, shares this view. He
notes that “(a)s long as graduates from the top MBA and law programs receive starting salaries
that are almost twice those received by graduates who earn advanced degrees at the top science
and engineering institutions … the former will most likely outnumber the latter.”
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An additional disincentive to the study of science and engineering is the increasing
uncertainty about job prospects. Research reveals widespread anger and frustration among
Silicon Valley electronic engineers about offshoring of engineering jobs to Asia. Some of
them emphasize that they can no longer recommend to their children to study engineering.
The increase in the numbers of financial analysts, lawyers, and certain medical professions
(reported, for instance, in the National Science Board’s Science and Engineering Indicators
2004) indicates that many students, in fact, have heeded this advice. This has caused a
serious domestic brain drain in the U.S. S&E community.
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Incentives to study science and engineering should by no means be limited to U.S.
citizens. There are compelling arguments for encouraging talented foreign students to come
to the United States for advanced graduate studies and to stay here after graduation to work
in private business or to join the faculties of American universities. One of the distinguishing
features of the United States has been its openness to foreign students and scholars. These
two communities have made important contributions to U.S. research and innovation. 
The latest “Science Engineering Indicators” report of the U.S. National Science Board
documents a dramatic decline in the number of visas issued to foreign students, foreign











It identifies two causes: (1) a decrease in the number of visa applications and (2) a substantial
increase in the proportion of visa applications rejected by the U.S. Department of State.
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The recent rising trend line in foreign student enrollments suggests that the U.S.
government has corrected some of the visa application procedures that caused the downturn.
But far more must be done to reestablish this country as a primary location for foreign
students and scholars. This is all the more necessary in view of the increased global
competition for graduate students, which, in the longer term, may prevent the United States
from entirely recovering the market share it has enjoyed in graduate education.
Develop complementary soft capabilities: Our research shows that formal education in
science and engineering per se is no longer sufficient to make engineers employable in
corporate R&D. As convincingly demonstrated by Donald A. Norman in his analysis of
the technology-centered bias of the computer industry, “The technology is the easy part to
change. The difficult aspects are social, organizational, and cultural.”
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The growing importance of complementary soft capabilities is due to the dramatic
changes described in the previous section about corporate R&D organization and the resultant
spread of GINs. More than ever before, it is now necessary to complement formal education in
specialized fields of engineering with a broad range of soft capabilities. These might include
a capacity to sense and respond to market trends before others take note (entrepreneurship),
a capacity to work in and to manage multidisciplinary and cross-cultural projects, and a
capacity to complement analysis with interpretation.
Lester and Piore emphasize that U.S. higher education in science and engineering tends
to combine an excessive specialization with too much focus on analysis, while neglecting
interpretation and knowledge integration. In their view, innovation requires both analysis
and interpretation. But analysis is much easier to teach and understand than interpretation.
The purpose of analysis is to solve problems. One divides the problem into a series of discrete
and separable components and assigns each one to a knowledgeable specialist. Analysis
works best when alternative outcomes are well understood and can be clearly defined and
distinguished from one another. 
But innovation hardly ever fits this pattern. Uncertainty and unpredictability are its
defining characteristics. Analysis therefore needs to be complemented by interpretation,
such as “a new insight about a customer, a new idea for a product, [or] a new approach to
producing or delivering it.”
96 For this to happen, S&E students need exposure early in their
studies to “real world” innovation projects in diverse companies through internships and
other arrangements.
Equally important is an exposure to other countries. American students “need inter-
national knowledge and inter-cultural communications skills that young graduates around
the world already receive as part of their higher education.”
97 In contrast to Asian students, a
large majority of American students will never study or work as interns abroad during their
student careers. According to Jim Hogan, a veteran Silicon Valley venture capitalist, “we live
in an insular society. By sending students to Asia, for instance, they begin to understand
global competition.”
98
In short, S&E students need training in business, an understanding of international
law and business, and an understanding of how to manage, or at least how to work








disciplinary approach to education instead of majors that are narrowly defined by (frequently
outdated) measures. It also requires strong knowledge-integrating capabilities, not just
analysis.
Encourage skilled foreigners to continue immigrating: One of the most contentious issues
is the immigration of skilled foreign knowledge workers. Industry associations and the big
research universities support a substantial increase in the number of entry permits for highly
skilled professionals. The American Electronics Association (AEA), for example, argues that
the United States “needs to decrease the bureaucratic and regulatory barriers delaying,
preventing, and discharging high-skilled workers from entering the U.S. workforce … .
Immigration is a critical component for maintaining a strong and vibrant technological
workforce.”
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Industry observers argue that initiatives aimed at restricting entry of foreign students
and limiting issuance of work permits for foreign engineers do not address the main
competitive challenge: “American students are confronted with competition not only from
qualified foreign students in the United States, but from … [chip] designers demanding
lower salaries in their home country.”
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Hence, policies to restrict entry to the United States through visa restrictions provide a
powerful incentive for U.S. high-tech firms to accelerate innovation offshoring. In fact, the AEA
concludes: “If companies cannot find enough qualified workers domestically and the barriers to
employing foreign workers remain high, companies will go to where the workers are located.”
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This plea for expanding high-skilled immigration is supported by economists who argue
that the migration of workers, like free trade in goods, is not a zero-sum game, but one that
usually benefits the sending and the receiving country. Experts also point out that the
United States needs skilled immigrants such as engineers and scientists, especially in high-
tech industries such as IT and biotechnology, since these are fields not attracting many
Americans.
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But there is also considerable fear that the visas are being used to bring in cheap foreign
workers who replace Americans. Hira and Hira argue that the current H-1B and L-1 visa
system is “tantamount to dumping, defined by the U.S. International Trade Commission as
‘the sale or likely sale of goods at less than fair value.’ In this case, the companies are bringing
in labor from abroad at less than fair value.”
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This gives rise to a fundamental dilemma captured effectively by Gary S. Becker, the
1992 Nobel Laureate in Economics: “To be sure, the annual admission of a million or more
highly skilled workers such as engineers and scientists would lower the earnings of the
American workers they compete against.” Becker acknowledges that “opposition from
competing American workers … is understandable,” but he insists that a protectionist
response would not be “good for the country as a whole.”
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This difficult issue must be addressed in developing a new national strategy on
innovation. To realize its economic potential, the United States must encourage the
continued immigration of skilled foreign knowledge workers. But at the same time, the
U.S. government must develop policies aimed at reducing possible negative impacts on
American knowledge workers. Such policies provide the best argument against protectionism









Adapting to the Blurred Boundaries of Innovation
Innovation offshoring has created a competitive challenge of historic proportions for the
United States. The challenge is driven by profound changes in corporate innovation
management as well as the globalization of markets for technology and knowledge workers.
U.S. companies, especially in electronics and other high-tech industries, are at the forefront
of these developments as they expand their overseas investment in R&D and seek to
integrate Asia’s new innovation clusters into global networks of production, engineering,
development, and research. But Asian governments and firms are playing an increasingly
active role as promoters and new sources of innovation.
Innovation offshoring has created substantial benefits for Asian countries. Exposure to
leading-edge innovation management approaches and improved access to critical technologies
have enabled Asian firms to strengthen their innovative capabilities. Consequently, they have
been able to enhance their competitive position in international trade and in the global
markets for technology and knowledge workers. 
If, as many economists argue, Asia’s ability to catch up to the United States has a positive
impact on global welfare, the main winners remain the U.S. corporations that employ
foreign knowledge workers either at home or overseas. By investing in offshore R&D labs,
these companies are able to substantially reduce the cost of U.S.-based scientists and
engineers but also gain access to complementary innovative capabilities. Furthermore,
innovation offshoring helps U.S. companies to penetrate the growing and increasingly
sophisticated markets of Asia.
As Asian countries improve their innovative capabilities, the U.S. share of global inputs
to the innovation process—such as R&D spending, knowledge workers, and the quantity
and quality of scientific literature—will gradually decline. Yet, the policies described in the
preceding sections can help to ensure that this does not translate into a sudden weakening
of the U.S. innovation system and its capacity to produce significant innovation outputs,
such as the quantity and quality of patents and market-defining standards. 
There is indeed reason for cautious optimism, but it is imperative that some of the
aforementioned policies are implemented as part of a new national strategy. The United
States should then be able to sustain and improve its environment for innovation, despite
the fact that the growing scope, distribution, and team-oriented nature of innovation will
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